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S. SIWEL Co. 1.1. COUNTY OF Los ANGELES

[L. A. No.

18935~In

[27 C.2d

Bank. Mar. 19. 1946.J

S. SIWEL CO. (a Corporation), Appellant, v. COUNTY OF
flOS ANnELRS et 81..~e~onaents.
[1] Improvements-Public - Assessment - Enforcement. - Where
all of the outstandiJ!g improvement bonds issued by a city
under the Acquisitid'iJ and Improvement Act of 1925 (8tats.
1925, p. 849; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1931, Aet 3276a; repealed
by 8tats. 1933, p. 949) were purchased and canceled by the
eounty pursuant to legislation eI!acted for the relief of property i
owners of special assessment districts (8tats. 1935. chap. 354;
Deering's Gt'n. Laws. Act 33031: 8ts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1625.51628). the assessments theretofore Jpvied by the city eould not
be legally pnfor(led by thp county. anrl thp amount of delinquent assessments pairl bv a propertv owner under protest was
either "erroneouslv or iIIe!!,aIlv eollecterl" from lItleh owner
within the meanin~ of Rpv. & Tax. Corlt'. § 509fi
[2] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayer-Olaim for Taxes Erroneously Collected.-Rev. & Tax. Code. fi 5096. is not limited to the
recovery of taxes erroneously or ilIe~ally levied. but authorizes
thp refund of t./l~P" "pY'Y'onpnll~lv nr illP!!'RIlV (lolJp('tprl."

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Alfred L. Bartlett, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action to recover special assessments paid under protest.
Judgment of dismissal after sustaining general demurrer to
eomplaint without leavE' to amena. reversed with directions. '

)

Murphey & Davis and Alex W. Davis for Appellant.

J. H. O'Connor. County Counsel, A. Curtis Smith, Deputy
County Counsel, and Clyde Woodworth, City Attorney
(South Gate), for Respondents.
EDMONDS, .T.-Under protest the S. Siwel Co. paid special assessments levied by the eity of South Gate, and brought
this action to obtain a refund. Upon the appeal from the
[1) See 9 Cal.Jur. to-Yr. Supp. 575.

MeR. Dig. References: [lJ Improvements-Public, § 35; [2J Tax·
atioD, § 29L

)
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judgment of dismissal entered after a genera] demurrer to the
complaint was sustained and leave to amend denied, the questions presented for decisIon concern the validity of the assessments and the scop~f certain sections of the Revenue and
Taxation Code.
The facts alleged in the complaint and a proposed amended
complaint may be summarize~ as follows: The appellant is
the owner of land in the city of South Gate bordering on
Wright Road, a highway o~general county use. The highway
was improved pursuant to a proceeding had under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925, commonly known as
the Mattoon Act (Stats. 1925, p. 84'9; Deering's Gen. Laws,
Act 3276a; repealed by Sta!..". ]933, chap. 346, p. 949). In
1929, Acquisition and Improyement bonds to the amount of
$43,400 were issued and sold. Special assessments were levied
against lands in the district, of which the appellant's property
constituted a large part. Levies for the years 1929-1933, inclusive, were paid b~' the Siwel Company, but assessments of the
four subsequent years, 1934-1937, inclusive, were allowed
to become delinquent. Only about 9 per cent of such assessments were paid by the property owners and the district was
in economic distress.
Prior to June, 1938, bonds in the principal amount of $4,000
and interest had been paid in full, but of the outstanding
bonds in the principal sum of $39,400, approximately $16,000
were delinquent in payment of principal and all were delinquent in payment of interest. The country was passing
through a period of severe economic depression and the land
values in the district shrank to a point where the total assessed
valuation of all the taxable property within the district was
at times less than the face value of the amounts outstanding
on the bonded indebtedness. Taxes and assessments against a
large percentage of the property in the district had been
delinquent for five years and unless financial aid was made
available, a considerable portion of the property would be
stricken from the tax rolls.
Appropriate legislation had been enacted for the relief of
districts in distress (Stats. 1935, p. 1250; Deering's Gen.
Laws, Act 3303lj Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 1625.5-1628 as amended
by Stats. 1935, pp. 2178, 2199, Stats. 1937, p. 160). In 1938,
acting pursuant to these provisions and prior to the levy of
liny assessment for that year, the board of supervisors 01
Los Angeles County adopted a resolution which, after reciting
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that Acquisition antI Impl'ovemeL\t District No. 11 of the city
of South Gate was in economic clistJ·css because of excessive
and burdensome special assdr"ments and eligible for relief
under sections 1626, 1627 and ]628 of the Streets and Highways Code, ordered that the 'county should purchase all of
the outstanding bonds anq.;.deliver the~ to the city for cancellation. Pursuant to the resolution, all of the outstanding
bonds were purchased and delivered to the treasurer of the
city of South Gate. By order of ~he board of trustees of
the city, on July 13, 1938, all of the bonds were canceled.
The appellant's demand thereafter made that the assessments for the years 1934-1937 be canceled was rejected by
both the city and county. S. Siwel Co. then made payment
under protest, and filed a timely claim for refund, followed by
commencement of the present suit.
In challenging the ruling of the trial court that these facts
do not state a cause of action entitling the Siwel Company
to a refund of the amounts paid by it to discharge the assessments levied prior to the retirement of the bonds, the appellant takes the position that the assessments were collectible
only for the purpose of meeting the obligation on the bonds.,
and the right to do so ceased to exist when the bonds were pahl
and canceled. Therefore, the argument continues, unless the
amount paid to satisfy the assessments for the years 19341937 is refunded, the city will be unjustly enriched. And:
the appellant asserts that the procedure specified by the
Revenue and Taxation Code may be used by a property owner
to obtain a refund of assessments paid under the circumstances related in the complaint.
The city and the county contend that the cancellation of
the bonds raised no bar to the collection of assessments theretofore levied. Under section 1626 of the Streets and Highways Code, it is said, the legislative body of the city was given
discretionary power to direct the cancellation of any unpaid
taxes and assessments, and in the exercise of that discretion
decided not to cancel the assessments levied before 1938
against the property of the appellant and other property
owners in the assessment district. If assessments levied prior
to 1938 are canceled, the respondents assert, the landowners
who defaulted in their obligations will obtain a benefit denied
to those who paid the assessments placed against their properties.
The Acquisition and Improvement Act, supra, pursuant to

)
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which the assessments now challenged by the appellant were
levied, provided a methodifor the construction of street improvements and the acquisition of land therefor. The legislative body of any municipality was authorized by the statute
to determine, after appropriate notoice and hearing, the improvements which were to be made and the district which
would be specially benefited by the improvements.
By the terms of the stathte, the cost of an improvement
was to be met by the issuance of bonds against the real property to be specially benefited by the improvements. Payment
of the bonds was to be made out of a'special fund to be eonstituted by the municipality for each district in which such
bonds were issued. Each year, at the time of levying taxes
for general municipal purposes, the city was required to levy
against all lands within the district, "a special assessment
tax in an amount clearly sufficient, together with any moneys
which are or may be in said fund, to pay all the principal
which has become or will become due and all interest which
has become or will become payable on the bonds . . . before
the proceeds of another . . . levy of taxes to be collected for
general municipal purposes . . . can be made available for
the payment of said principal and interest." These special
assessment taxes, the statute read, should be "in addition
to all other taxes levied for ... municipal purposes" (§ 41).
The city of South Gate has delegated its functions relating
to the collection of taxes to the county of Los Angeles. By
the terms of the Acquisition and Improvement Act, levies for
the payment of principal and interest requirements upon the
bonds were to be "collected and enforced in the same manner
and by the same persons and at the same time and with the
same penalties and interest as are other taxes." Also, the
statute speciiically adopted the procedure provided by general law for the collection of taxes for general municipal
purposes. (§ 41.)
Act 3303l declares that city and county legislative bodies
are "hereby fully and completely authorized and empowered,
on the consent of the owners or holders of such bonds or
indebtedness, to purchase, adjust, liquidate or cancel such
bonds or indebtedness, or any part of them or it, and to carry
out any plan or plans for the purchase, adjustment, liquidation, or cancellation of such bonds or indebtedness, or any
part of them or it," and to "adjust, waive or cancel in whole
or in part, any tax or taxes, assessment or assessments, penalty
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or penalties and interest heretofore levied or taxed against any
of the property or properties in such special assessment district
which have been taxed or levied for the purpose of meeting
the bonds or indebt_ness of such special assessment districts." (§ 1.)- Such legislative bodies are also authorized
"to appropriate and use any-'and all necessary funds, moneys,
taxes, assessments and contrib~ions, from whatsoever source I
derived, for the furtherance, consummation and conclusion of '
the purchase, adjustment, liquidation' or cancellation of any
bond or bonds ... in whole or in part of such districts, and
to pay from such funds, moneys, taxes, assessments and contributions all expenses necessary to carry on the furtherance,
consummation and conclusion of such plan or plans." (§ 3.)
Section 1626 of the Streets and Highways Code provides
that "boards of supervisors in their respective counties may
purchase or redeem at a discount, and may at any time in their
discretion cancel or retire, bonds of any special assessment
district, for the payment of which special assessments . . •
have been or are to be levied, if the proceeds of such bonds
are or have been used exclusively for the acquisition of rights
of way or easements for, or for the construction, maintenance,
improvement or repair of highways, bridges or culverts within
such county or any city therein. The board may also pay any
portion of the principal or interest of, or transfer such amount
as the board deems proper to the interest and sinking fund
for the discharge and payment of, any of such bonds."
Section 1626.5 of the Streets and Highways Code reads,
in part, as follows: "In accordance with the provisions of sections 1627 and 1628, the boards of supervisors, in their respective counties, may appropriate money to refund, repay
and adjust, by any method established by law, the principal,
or any portion of the principal, of any special assessments or ,
bonds issued to represent special assessments, which have
become liens on lands and which have been levied under the
direct or specific assessment method to pay for the acquisition
of rights of way or easements for, or the construction, main- "
tenance, improvement or repair of public highways, bridges,
or culverts within such county or any city therein."
In enacting legislation for the relief of the property owners;"
in special assessment districts (Stats. 1935, chap. 354; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 3303 l) the Legislature declared: "Dur~
ing the fifteen years last past hundreds of districts have been
organized throughout the State of California under the p~
I
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visions of the Road Distr~ct "'Improvement Act of 1907 and
the Acquisition and Im~ovement Act of 1925. Many of
these districts were created during times of great economic
prosperity and high land values. In many of such districts,
due to the optimism of the times, Or other causes, bonds for
public improvements w~re issued in amounts in excess of the
ability of the lands of Such districts to bear the assessments
necessary to pay th€ principal and interest on such bonds.
Millions of dollars in assessed land valuation are located
within districts created under these acts. Due to the present
economic depression land val~es throughout the State have
shrunk to the point where, in many cases, the total assessed
valuation of all lands within a given district is less than the
face value of the bonds outstanding in such district. Annual
assessments upon individual parcels of land within these districts amount in many instanceS to more than the assessed
value of such land.
"Under present economic conditions property owners are
unable to meet these high assessments and hundreds of such
districts throughout the State have reached a point of hopeless delinquency.
"Inasmuch as the property owners of these districts cannot,
under the law, pay their county or municipal taxes without
at the same time paying the district assessments many cities
and counties are unable to collect large sums of money badly
needed for the purposes of government.
"1)fany hundreds of properties in these districts are being
deeded to the State for delinquent taxes and assessments and
unless the financial aid of the counties is immediately made
available to assist these overburdened districts thousands of
parcels of lands will be stricken from the tax rolls this yearj
thousands of property owners will lose their homes, millions
of dollars in governmental revenue will be uncollectible and
at the same time thousands of bondholders will be unable to
realize any return upon their investments."
According to the allegations of the complaint, the economic
situation of Acquisition and Improvement District No. 11
in the city of South Gate was exactly that which the relief
statutes were enacted to remedy. Because of the inclusion of
the levy for special assessments in the total amount of municipal taxes standing against a large portion of the property
in the district and the sharp reduction in real estate values,
the owners were unable to meet their tax obligations and
delinquencies for he yean were eommoo.
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Full relief was given by the board of superVisors which, by
its resolution determined that this economic distress was occasioned by the excessive and burdensome special assessments.
The county p~chased all of the outstanding bonds and sent
all of them to the city of South Gate for cancellation. Pursuant to the county's request, a~l of the bonds were canceled
and, as the city and cOlaty each declare, these acts were done
with the intention of the cOunty to retain no claim for the
repayment of any portion of the $29,550 which it expended
for the bonds.
Yet, under these circumstances, it is vigorously contended,
the property owners who could not meet their taxes because
of the excessive and burdensome bond requirements were
left by the action of the county with a lien against their
property which could neither be enforced nor removed. Such
a result runs counter to every principle of equity and fair
dealing and does not give the full relief which was given by
the county.
[1] Manifestly, the relief legislation was enacted to aid;
property owners whose taxes were delinquent; the fact of de- i
linquency was stressed by the Legislature and recognized by
the board of supervisors as the justification for extending
relief. Undoubtedly the county acted in part for the benefi~'
of those property owners who had paid the assessments levied
prior to the cancellation of the bonds, but the situation which
the relief statutes were designed to remedy was the large:
number of tax delinquencies. For the county to purchase the I:
honds and cancel them but to leave the property owner with \
the same delinquent assessment which he had before would \
not meet the purpose of the legislation. If the assessments',
which the owner did not pay because of economic conditions '
could then be collected from him, the full relief intended by
the statute, that is, to get the property back on the tax rolls,
would not have been accomplished. For the land to be subject to the lien of delinquent assessments which could not be
removed would also be contrary to the legislative purpose.
Under these circumstances. the amount paid by the Siwel
Company under protest was either "eI'Nneously or illegally
collected" from it within the meaning of section 5096 of the
Revenue and Taxation Code. The word "taxes" as used in
that statute "inCludes assessments collected at the same time
and in the same manner as county taxes." (§ 4801.) [2] Moreover, seC'tion 50nS is not limited to the recovery of taxes er..
'I
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roneously or illegally levied but authorizes the refund of taxes
"erroneously or illegally c9lJ~cted." (Evans v. County of San
Joaquin, 67 Ca1.App.2d 1(52, 455 [154 P.2d 468].) The use
of the word "collected" rather than the term "levied" or
"assessed" is most significant. (Compare section 4986 authorizing a canceJ1ation of ~es ~"levied or charged. . . .
erroneously or illegally.")
This conclusion does not allow a property owner to withhold payment of an assessment and es<:ilpe liability for the
amount levied against his land if and when the collections
from other owners in the district provide sufficient money to
meet the principal and interest requirements upon unpaid
bonds. For it is only when the board of supervisors, acting
pursuant to the authority granted by the relief legislation
8,nd for the purpose of meeting economic distress within an
assessment district, purchases and cancels all of the outstanding bonds and authorizes their cancellation that the delinquencies of the property owner are forgiven.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to overrule the general demurrer to the complaint and to proceed in accordance with the views here expressed.
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

)

)

CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal and
am in accord with the views expressed in the opinion prepared by Justice Edmonds, but I believe there are other
grounds for reversal than those advanced in said opinion.
Briefly put we have a situation in which an improvement
was carried out by the city of South Gate in a certain portion or district of that city. To defray the costs of it bonds
were issued by the city. Those bonds were not general obligations of the city but their payment was secured by the levy
of a special assessment on the property in the district which
WaR benefited by the improvement. Economic conditions
impelled the Le/rlslature to enact laws for the relief of the
property in the district and for the broad purpose of restoring that property to the tax rolls in order that the general
revenue should not suffer. (Sts. and Hy. Code, §§ 1626. ]626.5,
1627, 1628.)
The position taken by respondents is that the relief legislation may be interpreted to mean that the county may purchase all of the bonds, cancel them and turn them over to the

)
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city. The latter may then cancel all or no part of the assessments which have been levied to retire the bonds. In other
words, the city could collect all of the assessments and devote
that money to whatever municipal purpose it desired in spite
of the fact that the f!lo~ey en?bling the city to so act came
from the county. SfIch broad discretion in the city with
respect to cancellation of tfssessment amounts in effect to a
gift by the county to the city, for the county would have no
control over the extent to which assessments were cancelled
although it supplied the money for'that purpose. The general taxpayers of the county would be compelled to pay for.
purely muni~ipal activities of the city. To 80 interpret the
act is to render it ~unconstitutional. Article IV, section 31"
of the Constitution of California, provides: "The Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize I
the giving or lending, of the credit of the State, or of any
county, city and county, city, township or other political
corporation or subdivision of the State now existing, or that
may be hereafter established. in aid of or to any person.
association, or corporation. whether municipal or otherwise, \
or to pledge the credit thereof, in any manner whatever, for,
the payment of the liabilities of any individual, association,
municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have
power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift,
of any public money or thing of value to any individual,
municipal or other corporation whatever." [Emphasis added.]
In applying the foregoing provic;ion of the Constitution this
court stated in City of Oakland v. Garrison, 194 Cal. 298,
303 [228 P. 433] :
"Section 31 of article IV of the constitution provides in
effect that the legislature shall have no power to authorize
the making of any gift of any public money to any municipal
corporation. It may reasonably be concluded. and we shall
assume for the purposes hereof, that this provision would
prevent the appropriation of county funds to a municipal
corporation even for a public purpose, if that purpose were
purel~' municipal and of no interest or benefit to the county
as a political subdivision." There are only two situations
here involved in which the county may transfer its funds to
a city without violating the Constitution. The first is where
the purpose is to restore property to the county tax roll and
thus lessen the burden of the general taxpayern of the county;
The county thus benefits and the purpose of the transfer of
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funds and use thereof is a public one and no gift has been
made. This ordinarily arises ~here the county cancels assessments in special assessment districts. Such was the case in
County of San Diego v. fiammond, 6 CaJ.2d 709. 728 r59
P.2d 478, 105 A.L.R. 1155J. where thi~ court !!tated: "Re_
spondents further complain tJ1fIt the improvementR for which
bonds werE' iRsued in some lnstance~~induded water mains or
sanitary sewers, or both, arrd that the count~· could not in the
first instance have levied a tax for such purposes. It will
be noted, however, that we have not based our conclusion
that the county may contribute toward the payment of said
original bonded indebtednes..q upon the ground that the county
could in the first instance have paid a part of the cost of said
improvement, but upon the ground that the purpose of the
payment of a portion of said indebtedness is to relieve the
property in said delinquent districts of the heavy burden of
taxes existing against it in order that the property may be
restored to the tax rolls of the county and thereby and thereaft~r bear its proportionate share of the expense of maintain·
ing said county." rEmphasiR added. ) However, in the case
at bar, if the city may in itq discretion refuse to cancel any
assessments although the county has with itq funds paid or
cancelled the bonds, and may collect the assessments, the
property will not be returned to the r.ounty tax roll for it has
not been relieved of the assessments. The county and itR general taxpayers have not benefited and hence no county publie
purpose has been served. The only way that the desired
result may be accomplished is that the assessments are necessarily cancelled to the extent that the county has used its
funds to purchase and cancel the bondR.
The second county public purpose. and hence not a gift,
which might be achieved would be where the money spent
is used for improvements in which the county has an interest
as distinguished from those of purely local city concern. We
have no !ffich mtuation here. There is no restriction upon
what use may be made of the asseSRllent.'l collected by the
city after the bond!: have been retired. The statute under
which the bonds were issued provide.q: .. Any money remaining in any acquisition and improvement district interest and
sinking fund after all of the bonds of the district have been
retired shall be transferred to the general fund of the . . •
municipality, as the cafle may be. whORe l~giRlative body has
had Jurisdiction over the proceeding and mal bl said ~

)
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be used in repairing any public way in said district, regardless of whether a portion or all of the district as originally
formed may have been included within one or more municipalitieR which did not include such portion or all of the district at the time the proceedipw; for the same were initiated!'
(Stats. ] 925. p. 892. § 41.) It is very doubtful that that sec- '
tion has any application to t~ funds involved in the instant
case, but even if it be assumed that ~ does, the money col- i
lected may be used for repairing publIc ways in the city in
which the countv has no conceivahle interest. Hence there is
a gift by the COll~ty to the city for a purely municipal purpose.
It is not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to
authorize the county to give fundR to the city and leave it I
to the arbitrary power of the latter to use them for other
than county purposes, thus violating article IV. section 31,
of the Constitution. And what is more, vest in the city the
power to completely thwart the sole purpose of the relief
statute, that is, to restore the property to the county tax rollR.
It must necessarily follow t.hat when the county, acting pursuant to the relief statute, buys the bonds and cancels them.
the city must cancel the assessment.'1 in a corresponding'
amount.
The foregoing interpretation of the statute is fortified by":
the expressions therein that the bonds which may be purchased'
by the county are those connected with an improvement from·
which the county benefit.'l. It provides: "It is the intention
of this section that the expenditures authorized in section
1625.5 shan not be made. and that the funds specified in
section ] 627 shall not be expended for any of the purposes
authorized in sectionR 1626 and 1626.5. i,f the p-u'blic highways, 'bridges or culverts are of only local use." [Emphasis
added. 1 (Sts. & By. Code, § 1628. ) If the city may devote
the money to purely local uses. t.he above safeguard is meaningle..'lS.
The relief legislation here involved contains the following
provision: "Whenever as the result of the retirement, cancellation or redemption of bonds as in this section provided,
the legislative body which conducted the proceedin~ for the
issuance of such bonds by resolution duly passed determines
that there is sufficient money in the intere.'lt and mnking fund
or other proper fund t.o adequat('ly provide for the retirement
or pa~JTl(>nt (If the pena lti('s. interest and principal of all
outstanding bonds of such district as the same are or shall
I
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was an overwhelming number of delinquencies on special
assessments throughout the state, often exceeding the actual
value of the lands assessed. Emergency legislation became
necessary to rescue the special assesment districts from insolvency and to enable the lands therein to bear their share
of the general tax burden. County boards of supervisors were
given wide powers to relieve special assessment districts and
to liquidate in whole or in part the indebtedness of such districts by purchasing and cancelling their bonds. The legislative bodies that conducted the proceedings for the issuance
of the bonds were given discretionary power to cancel delinquent assessments of such districts if they determined that
the relief of the district required such cancellation. The pertinent provisions of this legislation are quoted in the margin.·
Pursuant to this legislation defendant county purchased
the outstanding bonds and delivered them to defendant city
for cancellation. The defendant city refused to exercise its
power to cancel the delinquent assessments of the district.
The county, which collected the city's taxes, therefore collected the delinquent assessments levied against plaintiff's
land for the years 1934 t.o 1937. Plaintiff paid the delinquent
-seauou 1626, 1626.6, 1627 and 1628 of the Streetl and Bigh~
Coc1e (u amended by Stats. 1935, pp. 2178, 2199, State. 1937, p. 180)
pnride:
"'1628. la a.eeordance with the provlSions of sections 1627 and 1828,
the boardI 01 IAlpervi80rs in their respective counties may purchaae or
ncleem at a discount, and may at any time in their discretion can.cel or
retire bonda of any lpecial 8118essment district, for the payment of
which apeeUtJ 888e8SIllents, levied wholly or partly in accordance with
the UIe8I8d value of lands, or levied by direct 888essment, have been or·
are to be levied if the proceeds of IAlch bonda are or have been used
ealuaively for the &equisition of rights of way or easements for, or for
the oonstruction, mamtenance, improvement or repair of highways,
bridges or culverts within IAlch county or any city therein. The board
may alao pay any portion of the principal or interest of, or transfer IAlch
Ulount u the board deems proper to the interest and Bi.nking fund for
the discharge and payment of, any of IAlch bonds. Such bonds may be
redeemed or pnrch8l!led at not to exceed eighty per cent of the face value
of the unpaid principal and interest of lAleb bond.. Whenever &8 the
result of the retirement, cancellation or redemption of bonds as in thi8
section provided, the legislative body which conducted the proceeding8
for the issuance of IAlch bonds by resolution duly passed determines that
there ia I1liIicient money in the interest and linking fund or other proper
fund to adequately ~rovide for the retirement or payment of the. ~
ties, interest and prmcipal of all outstanding bonds of IAlch distnct u
the lUIle are or shall fall due, such legislative body may, in its diacre·
tion, direct the cancellation or, if its taxes are collected through an·
other legialative body it may in its discretion by resolution order such
other legislative body to direct the cancellation of all or any portion of
tile 1IIlpaid tall and UI8IBDlents and the penalties thereon and the liea
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assessments under protest and filed a claim with the county
for a refund on the ground that the assessments were illegally collected. The county denied the claim maintaining
that it was under a duty to collect the uncancelled assessments. The trial court upheld general demurrers interposed
by both defendants to plaintiff's complaint and entered a
judgment of dismissal. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff does not question the legality of the assessments
as originally levied or the fact that the assessments on its
property were delinquent while the bonds were still outstanding. Nor does it contend that the collections could be refunded had its assessments been paid before the bonds were
cancelled. It does contend, however, that there is a fundamental principle of special assessment law that an assessment,
even though validly levied and legally collectible when it
became delinquent, becomes illegal after the bonds are retired, since its collection is no longer necessary to redeem
the bonds. The alleged invalidity under this so-called principle arises, not from any defect in the assesments, but from
thereof levied or to be levied for the payment of Rch penalties, principal and interest. Such direction to cancel tues shall be made to and
the cancellation shall be made by the officer having control of the record
thereof, with the written consent of the district attorney, county counsel,
city attorney or other legal advisor of the legislative body directing the
cancellation. Whenever only a portion of such tues, assessments and
liens are cancelled, it mar be accordin~ to any uniform plan which in
the discretion of such legIslative body 18 deemed equitable. Where such
property has been deeded to the State or other subdivision for Buch
delinquent taxes or assessments a credit in similar amount shall be
A.llowed upon the amount necellBary to redeem. The officer who makes
the cancellation of taxes, assessments and liens as hereinabove provided
shall notify the State Controller or corresponding officer of such other
subdivision of the credit which shall be allowed upon the right of redemption and such State Controller or such other officer shall thereupon
allow such credit;' provided, however, that in all respects except the collection and disbursement of redemption money the tax deed shall not
be affected and shall remain unimpaired.
,
"1626.5. In accordance with the provisioDs of sections 1627 and
1628, the boards of Rpervisors, in theIr respective counties, may appropriate money to refund, repay and adjust, and may refund, repay and
adjust, by any method established by law, the principal, or any portion
of the principal, of any special assessments or bonds i88Ued to represent
special assessments, which have become liens on lands and which have
been levied under the direct or specific assessment method to pay for
the acquisition of rights of way 01' easements for, or the construction,
maintenance, improvement or repair of public highways, bridges, or
culverts within such county or any city therein. It the board of supervisors shall appropriate money to refund, repay or adjust assessments
or bonds levied or issued by a city, it may delegate to the legisla.tift
27 C.2d-.M
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the fact that a property owner successfully delays payment
of his share thereof until others have met the cost of the
improvement represented by the bonds. There is no such
principle of special assessment law. Nor could such a principle be adopted without repudiating the long established
role that special assessments are to be levied in accordance
with benefits. To forgive the delinquent property owners
solely because the nondelinquent owners or others have paid
enough to meet the cost of the improvement would defeat the
very object of making the levies in proportion to benefits and
discriminate against those who pay thcir assessments. At the
time of the levy, after the property owners are given noti~
and an opportunity to be heard, the share of each property
owner in the burden is determined. It is impossible at that
time to foresee what amount will actually be collected or in
what order collections from each owner will be made. If the
subsequent existence of funds in excess of the redemption
price of the bonds invalidated the collection of delinquencies
the shares of the individual property owners in the common
burden would be· fixed by the accidental course of the collecbody of such city the disbursement of the funds appropriated therefor
on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the board ;;d
the city.
"1627. The expenditures authorized in sections 1626 and 1626.5 may
be made from: (a) The general fund of the county •••
"1628. Before any expenditures are made under the authority of
section 1626.5 or of sections 1626 or 1626.5 and 1627, the board of
supervisors of the county shall, by a resolution adopted by a four-1I.ftha
vote of the members of the board, determine that the bonds or assessments, or the portions thereof, under consideration were issued or levied
to acquire rights of way or easements for, or to construct, maintain,
improve or repair public highways, bridges or culverts of general county
use, and not of a purely local use. It is the intention of this section
that the expenditures authorized in section 1626.5 shall not be made,
and that the funds speci1i.ed in section 1627 shall not be expended for
any of the purposes authorized in sections 1626 and 1626.5, if the public highwayS, bridges or culverts are of only local use."
Act 33031, Deering's General Laws (Stats. 1935, p. 1250), provides: Section 1. "The legislative body of any city or county, or city
and county, of the State of California, acting· individually or in conjunction with any other such legislative body or bodies, wholly or partly
within the boundary of which any special assessment district has been
created, and the outstanding bonds or indebtedness of which district
are payable by taxes or assessments levied wholly or partly in accordance
with the assessed value of lands or property, shall be and it is hereby
fully and completely authorized and empowered, on the consent of the
owners or holders of such bonds or indebtedness, to purchase, adjUlt,!
liquidate or cancel such bonds or indebtedness, or any part of them or
it, and to carry out any plan or plans for the purchase, adjustment,
liquidation, or cancellation of such bonds or indebtedness, or -1 pan,
I
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tions rather than by the fair distribution of that burden at
the time of the levy.
In fixing the amount of an assessment, it is common practice for an assessing body to make the levy higher than it
would have to if there were no delinquencies-a practice sanctioned by this court under the very act here in question.
(A'nterican Securities 00. v. Forward, 220 Cal. 566, 572··577
[32 P.2d 343].) Only by anticipating delinquencies at the
time of the levy can an assesment district expect to meet the
payments on the bonds as they fall due. It does not, however,
thereby forgive delinquent owners their share of the common
burden. If collections of delinquent assessments became illegal as soon as the bonds were retired or enough money was
on hand to retire them, delinquent property owners would
reap a reward for their delinquency at the expense of those
who paid their assessments. There would then inevitably be an
overwhelming delinquency in the final years of any bond issue
that would play havoc with the orderly collection of assessments. Many owners would soon learn that they could let
their special assessments go delinquent without ha"\"ing to let
their general taxes go delinquent (Loew's Inc. v. Byram, 11

)

)

of them or it, and if necessary or advisable to carry out such plan or
plans under the bankruptcy laws of the United States of America, and
any amendments thereto now or hereafter adopted, or under any law
or laws of the State of California, enacted for the purpose of the purchase, adjustment, refunding, liquidation or cancellation of bonds or
indebtedness of special assessment districts. In carrying out any such
plan or plans the legislative bodies herein mentioned are fully authorized and empowered to adjust, waive or cancel in whole or in part, any
tax or taxes, assessment or assessments, penalty or penalties and interest
heretofore levied or taxes against any of the property or properties in
such special assessment district which have been taxed or levied for
the purpose of meeting the bonds or indebtedness of such special assessment districts."
Section 2. "Such legislative body or bodies shall be and hereby are
also fully and completely authorized and empowered to enter into any
plan, contract, agreement, escrow or trusteeship having for its purpose
the purchase, adjustmenij liquidation or cancellation of the outstanding
bonds or indebtedness or such districts."
Section 3. "Such legislative body or bodies are hereby also fully
and completely authorized and empowered in connection with the furtherance, consummation or conclusion of any such plan or plans, con·
tracts, agreements, escrows or trusteeships to appropriate and use any
and all necessary funds, moneys, taxes, assessments and contributions,
from whatsoever source derived, for the furtherance, consummation and
conclusion of the purchase, adjustment, liquidation or cancellation of
any bond or bonds, indebtedness or indebtednesses, in whole or in part
of such districts, and to pay from such funds, moneys, taxes, t1.!'~eslt
menta and contributions all expenses necessary to earry on-the :further&nee, consummation and conclusion of 111M plan or plana."
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Ca1.2d 746 [82 P.2d 1]) and would depend on the payments of more conscientious owners to relieve them of the
necessity of paying their own assessments.
Likewise, delinquent assessments are not forgiveJl when the
money to purchase and retire the bonds comes from the general funds of the county. The relief given the district by the
county under the einergency legislation of 1935 did not automatically cancel the delinquent assessments. Such assessments
could have been cancelled under that legislation had the legislative bodies concerned, who alone have that authority, considered such cancellation necessary. (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1626,
1626.5; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act. 3303 l, § 1; Stats. 1935,
p. 1250.) That legislation expressly provides that cancellation of the assessments depends not only upon retirement of
the bonds but on action of the appropriate legislative body.
The authority to cancel assessments upon the retirement of
the bonds is given by the same statutory provisions that vest
in the legislative bodies the authority to purchase and rettre
the bonds, and it is a repudiation of those provisions for this
court to hold that the assessments are automatically cancelled
upon purchase and retirement of the bonds. There are many
reasons why the statutes make such cancellation discretionary
with such legislative bodies. Careful study must be made or
any district before it can be detennined which assessments
should be cancelled and which not. Delinquencies may vary
through the years preceding the last one, when there may be
a total delinquency. If assessments for the last year only were
cancelled, all property owners would be treated alike. It might
be highly inequitable, however, to cancel the assessments of:
the earlier years when some paid and others did not. If the
source of a district's difficulty were an exceptionally large
levy for a single year, the property might be rehabilitated by
cancelling, not all the assessments, but only the aMessment •
for that y e a r . .
The legislative body of the defendant city in the present '
ease decided that the assessments should not be cancelled, and '"
its judgment has been vindicated by the fact that the property
was ,so rehabilitated that the assessments could be and were
paid. In the absence of cancellation of the assessments under
the relief legislation of 1935, their collection is governed' by
section 41 of the Acquisition and Improvement Act, which
provides that assessments shall be "collected and enforced in
the same manner and by the same persons and at the sume
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time and with the same penalties and interest as are other
taxes for state and county purposes .•• and all laws applicable to the levy, collection and enforcement of taxes for
state and county purposes ••. (as the case may be) are
hereby made applicable to said special assessment taxeR. ,.
The assessments against plaintiff's property were validly
levied and placed upon the tax rolls. Since they were never
cancelled, but continued on the rolls as valid liens against the
property, section 41 compels their collection unless enforcement of that section violates some constitutional provision.
The contention is advanced that collection of delinquent
assessments after the county has purchased and cancelled the
bonds would result in an impairment of contracts in violation of the federal as well as the state Constitution. This contention is based on the provision in section 41 imposing upon
the municipality the duty to levy a special asses..<;ment tax in
an amount clearly sufficient "to pay the principal and interest
of said bonds as the same shall become payable." The theory
is that the language quoted forms part of the contracts of the
property owner with the bondholders and the district and
does not authorize an assessment except to obtain money to
pay the principal and interest of the bonds. It will be noted
that the foregoing provision refers to the "levy" of the assessment, and not to its collection. There is no contention that
any of the levies in the present case were unnecessary for the
purpose defined in the provision quoted; the alleged impair.
ment of contracts cannot therefore result from any failure
to observe that provision. Nor has there been any failure to
comply with the "collection" provisions of section 41, which,
as we have seen, compel the collection. of assessments in the
same manner as taxes for county purposes generally. The
terms of any contract under the Acquisition and Improvement
Act have thus been observed both as to thelevy of the assessments and their collection. Moreover, the emergency legislation
of 1935, pursuant to which the bonds were purchased and cancelled, did not enlarge the burden of plaintiff or other prop~rty
owners but on the contrary materially reduced it. All the
property in the district was relieved of the burden of assessments in subsequent years to meet accruing bond interest and
principal. At the outset the property owners were entitled to
relief from neither past nor future levies. Solely by virtue
of a contribution by the county from its general funds have
the owners been given relief from future levies. Such allevia-
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tion, which increa.'!ed the value of their properties, cannot rationaly be interpreted as an impairment of cont.ract rights .
of cither the delinquent or other owners. The contract clause
of the Constitution is "intended to preserve practical and
snbst.;lntial rights, not to maintain theories." (Faitoute Iron
& s. eo. v. Asbur11 Pm·Z·. ~1I1 F.R fi02, 514 f62 RCt. 1129,
86 L.Rd. 1629].)
It iR further contended that the county should have held
the bonds instead of cancelling them to prevent the collection
of the delinquent assessments from becoming invalid. The
assessments continued on the tax rolls as valid liens against
the property involved. however, and no statute or rule of law
made their validity dependent on the county's holding the
bonds until th{' assessments were paid. Bonds were essential
in the relationship between the city, the bondholders. and the
property owners. The redemption of the bonds eliminated
all outside creditors. and made it unnecessary for the county
to ret.ain the bonds. for the rights of defendants depended, not
on the county's acquiring the rights of the bondholders, but
on the relief legislation under which the bonds were purchased
and cancelled and the delinquent assessments continued on the
tax rolls. That legislation empowered the legislative bodies
granting relief to such districts to determine the extent of the
relief and the conditions under which it should be granted.
III the present case they determined that the relief should not
extend to the cancellation of the delinquent assessments but
t.hat such assessments should be collected. The statutory authority to retain the levied but unpaid assessments on the tax
rolls after the claims of the bondholders are satisfied enables
the agency, which, under authority of the same statute satisfied
those claims, to obtain reimbursement for part of its advances.
Reimbursement is in order here as in other instances where
creditors of insolvent debtors accept payment by third parties
in settlement of their claims and such parties are subrogated
to the claims of the creditors. (See 4 Williston, Contracts,
(Rev. ed.) 3628.3664; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jur. (5th ed.) 640;
McClintock Equity, 210; 50 Arn.Jur., Subrogation, §§ 28, 70;
23 Cal.Jur. 920; Meyers v. Bank of America, 11 Ca1.2d92, 94
[77 P.2d 10841; Brantley v. Kelly, 226 Ala. 47 [145 So. 649].)
If the purchase and cancellation of bonds by a county, contemplated by the relief legislation, resulted in automatic extinguishment of all delinquent assessments in the district,
the legislative bodies involved would have no discretion with
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respect to the cancellation of ::Iuch assessments as provided
by the Legislature, nor could a county obtain reimbursement
through collection of delinquent assessments for any funds
advanced to relieve a district in di:;;tress. Such a rule would
not only discourage advances and tJ1UR serve to defeat the
purposes of the relief legislation. but would conflict with ib~
express provil·:ions that the legislative bodies may use assessments to effect the relief of the district (Deering':;; Gen. Laws,
Act 3303 I, § 3) and may canccl them in their discretion.
(Sts. & H~1. Code. § 1626: neerin~'s Gen. fJaws. Act 33031,
§ 1.)
The county in the present case has elected not to reimburse
its general fund out of the collection of delinquent a.<;sessment.~
as it could have done under the provisions of the relief legislation. The provisions of the Acquisition and Improvement
Act therefore control the disposition of the money collected.
Under section 41 of that act. aU collections on assessment.'1 are
credited to the interest and sinking fund prescribed by that
section, and "any money remaining in any acquisition and
improvement district interest· and sinking fund after all the
bonds of the district have been retired shall be transferred to
the general fund of the county, or municipality, as the case
may be, whose legislative body has had jurisdiction over the
proceeding and may by said body be used i.n repairi.ng any
public way in said district, regardless of whether a portion
or all of the district as originally formed may have been
included within one or more municipalitie..q which did not
include such portion or all of the district at the time the
proceedings for the same were initiated." Thus if assc&"lments were collected in sufficient amounts to retire the
bonds, subsequent collections of delinquent assessments would
be credited to the acquisition and improvement district interest and sinking fund and would be money remaining
therein within the meaning of section 41. It is immaterial that
the excess arises out of advances by the county rather than
from the fact that the percentage of delinquencie..'1 WR:;; lower
than anticipated when the Ss:;;essments were levied. Pursuant
to section 41, therefore. the money collected would be transferrell to the general fund of the city of South Gate to be
used by it in repairing any public way in the district.
It is contended that only money that WM paid into the
interest and Rinking fund before the retirement of the bond:;;
can be regarded as "remaining" therein upon such retire-
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ment. The money collected, however, must be credited to the
interest and sinking fund and remains therein if it is not used
to pay intere.'~t and principal of the bonds. whether or not it
was in the fund when the last bond was retired .. The meaning
of the provision is clear: an~' money credited to snch interest
and sinkin~ fund shaH be used primariJ:v to pay interest and
principal of the bonds. credits in exceK~ of thE' total amount
required shall be transferred to the city'll general fund to be
used for repairs of publie ways in the district. Plaintiff contends that since there are only a few small public ways in
the .district. excepting Rtate and county highwaYII. the city
does not need the money to repair such ways. The statutory
provision. however. doeP not rePuppose that at the time of
the transfer of the money t.o the general fund of thE' city there
is any actual need to repair public wa~'s in the district. nor
doc,,,! it provide any time limit within which the mone~' must
be used for that purpose. The fact that thE' preclictable expenses for such repairs are low. given the present lIystem of
public ways in the district, does not make the transfer invalid.
The system of public ways in the di!:;trict may be changed
or the needs for repairs may increase. In any event. even if
the cost of such repairs were low. t.he useof the money by the
city would merely extend over a lon~er period than usual.
Furthermore. a court cannot foresee in litigation concerning
the collection of delinquent as."Iessment."I whether the city will
make proper use of the amount to be tranRferred to its general fund. It would be time enough to consider RllCh question
if the city'll use of this money were <,hal1enged in an ftPpropriatE' proceeding.
Any doubt as to the constitutionalit~, of section 1626 of the
Street.'l and Highways Code is resolved by the constitutional
amendment adopted November 3, 1936. adding lIection 31 (c)
to article IV : uNo provision of the Constituti~n shall be con·
strued as a limitation upon the power of the I.legislature to
provide by general law for the refunding. repayment or
adjustment. from publie fundR raised or appropriated by the
United States. the State, or any city. city and county. or
county for street and highway improvement purposes. of
assessments or bonds. or any portion thereof. which have become a lien upon real property. and which were levied or
issued to pay the cost of street or highway improvement."I or
of opening and widening proceeclin!lS which may be or may
have become of more than local benefit. Any such acts of the
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Legislature heretofore adopted are hereby confirmed and declared valid and shall have the same force and effect as if
adopted after the effective date of thh> amendment." The
county's expenditure in the present case to redeem bonds
issued for the improving of a highway of general county
use was made pursuant to legislation expressly confirmed
and declared valid by this constitutional amendment.
Plaintiff's contentions find no support in the cases on which
it relies. There is no que..~tion as to the validity of the assessments as originally levied or as to the fact that the assessments
were a valid lien upon plaintiff's property when they became
delinquent and when the bonds were still outstanding. The
cases cited that concern assessments invalid when levied are
therefore not in point. Thus, in Oon'Mlly v. San Francisco,
164 Cal. 101, 103 [127 P. 834], the levy was void because no
bonds had been sold or contracted to be sold at the time it was
made. In Hellman v. Los Angeles, 147 Cal. 653 [82 P. 313],
t.he levy was void because the ordinance providing for it
described bonds that were not in existence. In Smith v. Santa
:~!onica, 162 Cal. 221, 223 [121 P. 920], land condemned by
t he state for a park was held immune from sale under a tax
Jiell on the ground that the lien was "merged and lost in the
title which the state itself has taken." (See, also, 48 Am.Jur.
(l-t,4.) In the present case no title has been established paramount to the lien of the assessments. Plaintiff relies particularly on two lines of cases that are clearly distinguishable.
In the first, the improvement was abandoned before completion. (Grimes v. Oounty of Merced, 96 Cal.App. 76 [273 P.
839]; Bradford v. Oity of Ohicago, 25 TIL 349; Valentine v.
Oity of St. Paul, 34 Minn. 446 [26 N.W. 457]; Oity of San
Antonio v. Peters (Tex. Civ. App.) , 40 S.W. 827; Oity of
San Antonio v. Walker (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S.W. 952.} In
the second, the actual cost of the improvement was less than
the original estimate. (Paving Dist. No.5 v. Fernandez, 144
Ark. 550 [223 S.W. 24] ; Oity of Ohicago v. Fisk, 123 Ill.App.
404; In re Schneider, 136 App.Div. 444 [121 N.Y.S. 9]; Wolfe
v. Edgewood Borough, 58 Pa.Super. 38.) Thus in all these
cases the assesments exceeded the value of the improvements.
In the present case, however,the plaintitf has received the
full benefit of the improvements and has not been assessed
beyond its cost. In fact, even with the payments in question,
it has paid less than its pro rata share of the cost of the project.
All the property owners in the district should be treated alike.
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The allowance to plaintiff of a refund of the payments of
its delinquent assessments creates an unfair discrimination
against the other property owners who paid their assessments
and who, as plaintiff concedes, are not entitled to a refund,
and gives plaintiff a windfall as a reward for its delinquency.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.

